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IS THE UCC DEAD OR MERELY
LANGUISHING?
Anita F. Hill*
The question "Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?" most certainly
is posed only for the purpose of providing commercial law scholars the
opportunity to engage in academic debate. Surely an American law that
has been enacted in all fifty states and is in effect in the District of Co-
lumbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands can only be described as alive.
Moreover, each year thousands of claims involving the UCC are liti-
gated. For example, section 2-207, which deals with valid acceptance
and rejection of goods, is a fertile source of litigation. The case law of the
Uniform Commercial Code is reported by the most prominent unofficial
case law reporting service1 and in official legal publications.' The Code
has earned its own publication devoted solely to UCC cases.' And fi-
nally, despite its faded novelty, courses on the Code continue to be part
of the curriculum of every law school in the country and, predictably, the
subject of scholarship of those who teach the Code courses. One need
look no further than this Symposium to be reminded of the scholarly
value of the Code. Because'in many instances it has become worn, and,
perhaps, overextended, the Code is renovated by revisions and additions.
Several articles of the Code have been revised or are currently the subject
of revision efforts. Recently, new articles have expanded the Code's
scope and coverage. The Code is commonly litigated, analyzed and
debated.
Unless this activity is simply aimed at chronicling the Code's his-
tory, the UCC is not dead. Perhaps the question, "Is the Code Dead or
Alive?" is not academic so much as it is incomplete. It ignores at least
one other potential state of being. Perhaps the UCC is alive and ailing or
"dying a lingering death."4 In true academic fashion, rather than ask
whether the Code is "Dead, or Alive and Well" in the face of the new
developments in state, federal and international law, I might reformulate
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law School; B.S., 1977, Oklahoma State
University; J.D., 1980, Yale University School of Law.
1. U.C.C. Reporting Service (Callaghan).
2. For example, official legal publications include U.S. Reports, the Federal Reporter, the
North Eastern Reporter and the Pacific Reporter.
3. See supra note 1.
4. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 4 (1974).
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the question to posit whether the Code, though alive, can coexist happily
and perhaps even healthily amidst the profusion of related legal develop-
ments. Can the once fashionable Code suffer being out of fashion with
dignity and grace, or will it become a "lame duck" destined for replace-
ment by younger and more innovative successors?
I. ASSESSING THE CODE'S FUTURE THROUGH AN ADMIT'TEDLY
UNSCIENTIFIC LOOK AT ITS PAST
The Code is alive, and though currently languishing, can be made
happy and healthy again. Convincing the doubtful, both here and
abroad, of the importance of the Code's continued vitality is, of course,
the difficult task. Moreover, determining who in the legal community is
best able to carry out that task is equally difficult. Convincing the doubt-
ers can be undertaken in a variety of ways, two of which are most obvi-
ous. First, one could begin to persuade the naysayers of the Code's
significance by showing them what life without the Code would be like.
Second, one could show the Code's viability by pointing out its strengths
relative to other doctrines which are generally thought to be healthy.
This first, rather Capra-esque approach would not simply point out the
cacophony of commercial utterances that existed prior to the Code, but
would also present a drastically different and utterly grim picture of con-
temporary commercial life without the Code.
Beginning with some of the pronouncements found in Article 2,
there is ample evidence that the Code has not only impacted contract
issues arising from sales of goods but has impacted the law of commercial
and consumer exchanges in general. The Code's adoption of the equita-
ble principle of unconscionability allows courts of law to overtly police
bargains in contracts for sales of goods. Moreover, its extension to other
types of contracts, either by analogy or by legislative enactment,6 helps
reduce the amount of muddled reasoning engaged in by pre-Code courts
that attempted to do covertly what they could not do overtly.7 Section 2-
302 has invited judicial review of the bargaining processes that lead to a
contract clause pre-designating a biased arbitrator,8 or a contract clause
5. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
6. See Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Mass. 1980) (applying,
by analogy, Code's provisions of unconscionability to franchise contracts); see also CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) (providing remedies for substantive and procedural
unconscionabiity).
7. For a harsh criticism of pre-Code cases, see Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rv. 485, 537-38 (1967).
8. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1981).
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allowing a 400% markup on a standard priced item.9 While the provi-
sion's application has resulted in highly criticized opinions, with today's
increased consumer awareness, the inevitable and unfortunate alternative
would be a loss of confidence in the courts.
Equally impressive is the Code's impact on the law governing excuse
of contract performance and warranties. Section 2-615 is a lucid synthe-
sis of various confusing pre-Code common-law doctrines. As Judge J.
Skelley Wright noted, section 2-615 frees the law from "the earlier fic-
tional and unrealistic strictures" found in the pre-Code legal tests for
excuse."0 While far from creating settled doctrine, section 2-615 relieves
the court from the mental connections often required to determine what
was an "implied term" or what was in the parties' "contemplation" at
the time of the contract, which seems much like trying to establish when
the parties had a meeting of the minds for purposes of contract forma-
tion. Modern transactions involving multiple parties in various countries
present adequate complexities, without the necessity of a court trying to
look into the minds of the parties to establish their legal rights. One
wonders whether such could ever be ascertained in a contract involving
the sale of radio parts by a United States company through a Swedish
distributor to an overthrown government in Iran, once the goods have
been detained by United States Customs officials.'
The warranty provisions of Article 2 have paved the way for third
parties to raise claims against manufacturers with whom they are not in
privity. In particular, section 2-318 allows a purchaser's family members
to assert actions for breaches of warranty on products used in the house-
hold. This extends vertical privity, while the official comments to section
2-318 leave open the possible extension of horizontal privity. Thus, the
Code narrows the gap between torts and contracts and allows for further
extension of third-party rights under contract law. 2 The extension of
Article 2's provisions to other types of contract, and the application of
9. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); see also Carboni v.
Arrospide, 2 Cal. App. 4th 76, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (1991) (invalidating note with repayment
interest rate of 200% per annum). In Carboni, a $4000 loan was made in July of 1988. Id. at
79, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846. By the time of trial, March of 1990, the principal plus interest on
the note amounted to $390,000. Id.
10. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11. See Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., No. Civ-88-679T, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20006, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990).
12. See Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (distinguishing between
personal injury claims covered by tort law and purely economic loss covered by contract law,
and requiring privity of contract). But see Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 581 So. 2d 449
(Ala. 1991) (extending privity to remote buyer of specially made trailer home in suit against
trailer home manufacturer).
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Article 2 principles in what previously had been considered the tort
arena, indicate the continued vitality of the UCC beyond its defined
scope.
Yet the true skeptic will not be convinced of the Code's future utility
by evidence of its past or current accomplishments. Many will find it
difficult, if not impossible, to suspend present reality long enough to im-
agine a world prior to the Code, much less one where there never was a
Code. Others will argue that the law's only significant contribution is
that it can contribute to solving future problems. Much like the debate
in legal scholarship between the practitioners and the academics over
whether legal "scholarship" is best about lawyerly argument or academic
inquiry, no clear dichotomy can or should be drawn. To the extent one
can distinguish between the work of lawyers and that of academics, one
reasonably can conclude that both contribute to the improvement of the
law. Similarly, one cannot begin to contemplate the future life of the
Code without pondering its past.
I argue that there is a future for the Code, notwithstanding the myr-
iad of other commercial laws, because there remain many questions and
many areas to be explored. Many of these new areas of concern are
brought to our attention by the very works that threaten to replace the
Code. In addition, a future for the UCC exists because a general, domes-
tic commercial law doctrine, consistent with federal or international law,
has never been articulated, much less adopted. Development of such a
doctrine is crucial to the future of domestic as well as international com-
mercial law, whatever the structural basis for that law may be.
II. THE CISG: A UCC SUCCESSOR?
In assessing the present and future need for the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, one should examine alternatives for its replacement. One po-
tential replacement is the international convention. The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)I3
has been ratified by the United States and several other countries. Yet,
one must only look fleetingly at the literature discussing the CISG before
becoming aware of its shortcomings. Its most obvious imperfections are
noted, of course, by its critics.4
13. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter CISG], reprinted in 52
Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987).
14. See Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984) [hereinafter Rosett, Critical
Reflections]; see also Arthur Rosett, The International Sales Convention: A Dissenting View, 18
[Vol. 26:651
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Generally speaking, any successful attempt at a uniform law will be
marked by compromise. The CISG is no exception; for that matter,
neither is the UCC. International uniformity suffers the additional bur-
dens of divergent language, culture and legal systems. According to Ar-
thur Rosett, the drafters of the CISG sought "to straddle two points of
view" in an effort to reconcile these differences rather than seek imagina-
tive approaches free of the existing conceptual baggage. 15 Thus, Rosett
disagrees with the doctrinal strategy of the drafters who "often buried
problems without resolving them.., or adopted a verbal formula which
hides persistent disagreement."
16
International scholars have also remarked on other substantive and
procedural failings of the CISG. For example, the CISG fails to "ad-
dress problems of risk of loss ... in documentary sales transactions in
which trade terms are.., used,"17 resolve the issue of whether a party
may enforce a clause banning oral modifications," clarify the relation-
ship between the CISG and domestic tort law where issues of damage to
property are raised, 19 recognize imbalances in parties' bargaining
power,' ° and recognize the legal and cultural values of underdeveloped
countries.21 These weaknesses in the CISG suggest that we should not be
so quick to supplant the UCC with the principles embodied in the CISG
or any other international enactment.
International law scholars call for strengthening the international
law system by clarifying the distinctions between "hard" and "soft" in-
ternational obligations and by developing "soft" law formulations.2 In
INT'L LAW. 445 (1984) [hereinafter Rosett, International Sales] (discussing central defects of
CISG).
15. Rosett, Critical Reflections, supra note 14, at 286.
16. Rosett, International Sales, supra note 14, at 447; see also Rosett, Critical Reflections,
supra note 14, at 286-93 (providing examples of specific provisions that compromise CISG's
effectiveness).
17. Harold J. Berman & Monica Ladd, Risk of Loss or Damage in Documentary Transac-
tions Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 423,
423 (1988).
18. See Robert A. Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect of "No Oral Modi-
fication" Clauses, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 449, 458-63 (1988).
19. See Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and Contract-Opening a New Fron-
tier?, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 467, 471-72 (1988).
20. See Arthur Rosett, CISG Laid Bare: A Lucid Guide to a Muddy Code, 21 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 575, 581-82 (1988).
21. See Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22
STAN. J. INT'L L. 263, 301-02 (1986).
22. Although a solid definition of "soft law" is difficult to establish, one of the characteris-
tics of "soft law" is that its obligations are expressed in terms of "guidelines" or "codes of
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
contrast, hard law obligations include treaties that are precisely worded
and contain identifiable rights and duties.23 In sum, because of a variety
of current political, legal and social developments, international law is in
a state of flux. Some commentators suggest that the CISG's24 problems
go unaddressed because of specific failures that may be better addressed
by domestic uniform law." The doctrinal concerns raise caution, as
well, against application of the CISG principles to domestic contracts.
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE LIFE OF THE CODE
Before one can urge the adoption of the UCC doctrine, more exposi-
tory work must be done to establish what doctrine the UCC espouses. If
the commercial scholar has failed to sustain the vitality of the Code in
any way, it is in failing to fully develop a doctrine of domestic commer-
cial law that the Code either does or should follow. Developing a doc-
trine is crucial for the continued existence of the Code in its present
form, and certainly in a modified or amended form.
The law is not self-defining, either in its content or its duration. If it
were, the legal system could dispense with courts, and legal scholarship
would be meaningless. If the UCC is to remain alive, and to be strength-
ened when necessary, judicial opinions must adhere to some ideology of
commercial law. Scholarly commentary must continue to struggle to de-
termine the actual and contemplated philosophy of commercial law.
For some time, legal commentary has focused particularly on the
jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn, as expressed in Article 2 of the Code.26
In one provocative piece, Professor Danzig described the Code's ap-
proach as a guide to law finding, whereby the decision maker is to search
for the answer to difficult questions by observing the behavior of those in
the marketplace.27 The Code, he observed, only minimally reflects a
moral imperative and in Llewellyn's own words is meant to be nonpoliti-
conduct." Typically, "soft law" obligations, even when contained in treaties, are weak require-
ments that are not binding on the parties to the treaties involved. See C.M. Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 850, 859-62 (1989); Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange
Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 443-44 (1983); R.A. Mullerson, Agora: New Thinking
by Soviet Scholars, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 511 (1989).
23. Chinkin, supra note 22, at 851.
24. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
25. See Rosett, Critical Reflections, supra note 14, at 286.
26. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 621 (1975).
27. Id at 626-27.
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cal in character.2" Other inquiry into the questions of what the Code
does has focused at least as much on what the Code should do. The
discussion has been dominated by a group of scholars who suggest that
the law is, or at least should be, efficient. These scholars urge that parties
make efficient decisions absent conflict, and thus courts' opinions should
reflect the efficient decisions that the parties themselves would have made
had they rationally foreseen the occurrences that brought about the
conflict.
Efficiency should guide decisions even at the expense of the precise
language of the Code. 9 From this, one can conclude that these later
commentators would suggest that the Code's drafters intended efficiency
as their goal and that such should be the goals of subsequent drafting and
revision. Although both positions have been argued, debate on the issue
of the Code's ideology generally presumes the legitimacy of Llewellyn's
"mercantile" approach and the efficiency approach, rather than begin-
ning with the premise that a law claiming to be amoral, nonpolitical and
efficient will simply reflect the moral, political and economic choices of
its interpreters.
Both the "mercantile" approach attributed to Llewellyn and the effi-
ciency approach ignore many of the political, economic and social
changes present in today's commercial climate. Just as the lines between
states became blurred, leading to the enactment of uniform domestic
commercial law in the form of the Code, the lines between countries are
being blurred. However, cultural and political differences between coun-
tries continue to exist and are more profound than interstate differences.
Thus, anything other than a very broadly stated uniform international
commercial law will suffer from being too general or suffer from impos-
ing cultural and political standards on those who may adopt it. Never-
theless, as more U.S. corporations invest in foreign countries and engage
in exchanges with corporations abroad, and as more foreign corporations
become a part of our domestic commercial landscape, domestic commer-
cial law must take into account the political, economic and cultural dy-
namics of entities that exist primarily outside of our borders.
Our domestic commercial ideology must begin to address what
some have chosen to ignore, that law is more than efficiency and that
28. Id. at 628; Memorandum from Karl Llewellyn to the Executive Committee on Scope
and Program, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Re: Possible
Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 524 (1973).
29. See George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods
under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978).
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even commercially reasonable parties make decisions that are cultural
and political in nature. It has always been that way, and as we begin to
abandon the ideal of homogeneity in relevant commercial practices, it
will be even more so. Our legal scholarship about what the law is, as well
as what it should be, must reflect this reality.,
IV. CONCLUSION
The UCC is not dead. Historically, it represents one of the most
important contributions ever made to American law. Currently, it influ-
ences commercial law and legal development throughout the world. At
the same time, its domestic reach is being broadened. Its future may in
fact be in doubt. Understanding its future may lie in harmonizing its
jurisprudence with changes in commercial circumstances. To the extent
that this is true, the UCC's future is in the hands of legal scholars. To
borrow the words of one commentator, its future is too important to
leave to lawyers.30
30. See Danzig, supra note 26, at 622.
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